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What Can Be Done
About Them?
Bringing people together to 
accelerate growth and 






A few years ago, then-President Festus Mogae of1 
Botswana addressed a small group of Washington-
based development experts on the economic and devel-
opment issues facing his country. Botswana is one of 
Sub-Saharan Africa’s rare middle income success sto-
ries. Its government and political processes are among 
Africa’s most stable. It ranks 45th out of 181 countries 
in the World Bank’s 2009 Doing Business survey, Sub-
Saharan Africa’s third best business environment after 
the island economy of Mauritius and South Africa. Even 
in the face of these achievements, President Mogae was 
concerned about his country’s future. His first worry was 
not surprising: Botswana has one of the world’s highest 
HIV infection rates, a major constraint to growth and 
prosperity. His second worry was less predictable. As he 
put it, “We have one of Africa’s best business environ-
ments, yet, except for our extractive industries, foreign 
direct investment is not coming into our country. Our 
economy is still much too diamond dependent. What 
more must we do to attract international investment and 
to diversify?”2
Indonesia is also a development success story. Yes, 
the messy transition from Suharto to democracy set the 
country back, but less than many people predicted, and 
before that transition Indonesia was a true development 
superstar. Starting from economic, political and interna-
tional bankruptcy in the mid 1960s, Indonesia averaged 
annual growth of more than 7% in real terms for the 
next 30 years. Income distribution improved, poverty 
plummeted. This “East Asian miracle” was produced on 
the back of prodigious foreign direct investment, much 
of it outside of extractive industries. For most of those 
30 years, Indonesia was ranked as one of the most 
corrupt countries in the world by a host of international 
measures. Even today it ranks only 122th in the 2009 
Doing Business ranking, and 111th in the Corruption 
1  The author is a Principal for the Results for Development Institute, United 
States
2   Oral remarks by President Mogae at a Center for Global Development 
luncheon, Oct. 11, 2006
Perceptions Index. 
Botswana’s and Indonesia’s stories tell us two things 
about “business environments.” First, they are a means, 
not an end. The “end” is diversified, long term private 
sector growth. Second, at the very least, scoring well on 
“doing business” surveys seems neither necessary nor 
sufficient to foster increased private sector investment 
and diversified growth. Other factors are obviously at 
work. 
If private sector growth is the real concern behind 
the question this paper sets out to address, it makes 
sense to look first at what we know about determinants 
of private sector growth before we consider countries’ 
business environments. The next section does this 
through the lens of the 2008 Commission on Growth 
and Development, in which both Botswana and 
Indonesia figure prominently. Guided by the Growth 
Commission findings, Sec. III looks first at the five 
Central Asian republics (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, 
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan) through a con-
ventional “doing business” lens, and asks what else 
is missing from the recipe—actually, as we shall see, 
recipes—for successful private sector growth and offers 
a set of suggestions for each country on how to encour-
age future private sector growth. Sec. III concludes 
with briefer overviews of four “neighboring” countries, 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Mongolia. The final 
section summarizes main messages, and providing 
answers to six specific questions set by the Emerging 
Markets Forum. 
II.  What determines 
private sector growth?
It need hardly be said that the ultimate goal of develop-
ment—and development assistance—is to give people, 
especially the poor, better lives. For most countries, it 
is difficult to think how this goal could be accomplished 
without steady, diverse, sustainable, broad-based, 
equitable growth, what I call “good growth” from here 
on. The literature on determinants of good growth, which 
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almost always means private sector growth, is large 
and surprisingly inconclusive. The most comprehensive 
recent overview of what determines countries’ growth 
is the World Bank sponsored Growth and Development 
Commission3 chaired by Michael Spence. Of course, not 
everyone agrees with the Spence report conclusions4, 
but it is a generally sensible overview of what we know—
and don’t know—about what countries need to do to 
grow, and, therefore, a good way of launching our review 
of Central Asia’s business environments.
Spence and his blue ribbon panel spent two years 
searching for the secrets to growth. Their approach 
was to focus on countries that achieved at least 25 
years of 7+% growth since 1950. There were 13, and 
only 13, such countries, which, in and of itself, says 
something about the challenge poor countries face. 
In its deliberations, the Commission discovered many 
paths to good growth, with different paths depending 
on country circumstances, including history, culture 
and geography, global conditions, and, fortunately for 
development economists, their own domestic policies. 
The Commission concludes, perhaps predictably, that, 
“Wedded to the goal of high growth, governments 
should be pragmatic in their pursuit of it….If there were 
just one valid growth doctrine, we are confident we 
would have found it.” There is much that determines 
growth outside the control of individual countries, but, 
according to the Report, much that is within each 
country’s control. But, they also found that what is within 
countries’ control is not independent of factors outside 
of their control.
A sometimes implicit but important message in 
growth studies is that most everything matters. The 
Spence report is no exception. No one aspect of a 
country’s policies or characteristics alone guarantees 
good growth. This may seem obvious, but it is nonethe-
less important to keep in mind as we review Central 
3  Commission on Growth and Development, The Growth Report: Strategies 
for Sustained Growth and Inclusive Development, The World Bank, 2008.
4  For a supportive view of the Spence report, see, Martin Wolf, “Useful dos 
and don’ts for fast economic growth,” Financial Times, June 3, 2008. Not surprisingly, 
William Easterly finds the report less convincing. See, “Trust the development experts – all 
7 billion of them,” FT, May 28, 2008.
Asia’s business environments. As Botswana and several 
of the countries discussed below show, you can get a lot 
of things right in your business environment and still not 
have the diverse, sustainable growth you need. Good 
growth requires not just a friendly business environment, 
but good quality human resources, cost effective and 
available infrastructure, and, importantly, access to suf-
ficiently large markets to allow countries to produce at 
scale. 
The Growth Commission’s 13 Stars – 
What Do They Have in Common?
If anything confirms the Commission’s basic finding that 
there is no one path to good growth, it is the diversity of 
the 13 countries that achieved high growth for extended 
periods. These countries are Asia dominated (9 of 13: 
China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Republic of Korea, 
Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand), but include one 
African country (Botswana), one Latin American country 
(Brazil), one Middle Eastern country (Oman), and one 
Mediterranean country (Malta). The 13 range in size from 
some of the world’s most populous countries (China, 
Brazil, Indonesia) to an island economy with under a 
half million people (Malta). Only one of the stars is land-
locked (Botswana), an important consideration for this 
study as all but one of the focus countries of have no 
direct access to the sea. 
Even within the Asian group there are significant dif-
ferences in starting points, contexts, histories. Politically 
these countries run—or ran—the gamut from democracy 
to dictatorship, although most had either dominant lead-
ers or dominant political parties at the beginning of and 
during their high growth periods. Institutionally, the Asian 
successes contain the world’s most professional (and 
highly paid) civil service (Singapore) and, at least during 
the period under review, among the most governance 
challenged (Indonesia). Underlying economic models 
range from openly dirigiste (China, and, to a lesser 
extent, Japan, South Korea) to about as free market as 
you can get (Hong Kong). It would seem that the “many 



















































































the important issue for Central Asia is not this diversity, 
but the common elements in these stories.
Many of the common elements, somewhat 
ironically, look a lot like the rules of success set out in 
John Williamson’s now much maligned Washington 
Consensus5, which the Growth Commission Report is 
said to replace. Among these are6:
1.  Outward openness is the base for most successes. 
Inward looking strategies work for a while, but are 
not sustainable.
2.  Product and factor markets must be open and 
flexible. Resources, most especially labor, must be 
mobile, and firms allowed to enter and exit if devel-
oping economies are to innovate, adapt, change 
and grow.
3.  Macroeconomic stability is important, but, perhaps 
more revealing, it is microeconomics that drives the 
growth process.
4.  Where labor is abundant, which is the case in most 
developing countries, growth is limited by the rate of 
investment.
5.  Savings determine investment, but the source of 
savings matters. Foreign savings is not an especially 
good substitute for domestic savings.
6.  “No country has sustained rapid growth without…
keeping up impressive rates of public investment–in 
infrastructure, education and health.”
7.  “Policies must…be faithfully implemented and toler-
ably administered.”
8.  “Governments in the high-growth economies 
were not free-market purists. They tried a variety 
of policies to help diversify exports or sustain 
competitiveness.”
9.  “…growth strategies cannot succeed without a 
commitment to equality of opportunity…”
10.  To be sustained, high growth needs “an increasingly 
capable, credible and committed government.”
5  The origins of the Washington Consensus can be found in John Williamson, 
“What Washington Means By Policy  Reform,” Latin American Adjustment: How Much Has 
Happened? Edited by John Williamson. April 1990.
6  The order reflects their appearance in the Report’s Overview. Quotes are 
from the Overview.
These 10 points are for the most part self evident, 
but it may be worthwhile pointing out how they relate 
to Central Asia’s business environment. The first point, 
openness, is nuanced in the Report, as it should be, 
reflecting the long debate over the degree to which 
some of the East Asian successes constituted open 
economies. The second and third points are about 
various elements of the “business environment”—labor 
and factor market restrictions, the macroeconomic and 
microeconomic policies (rules, regulations, red tape), 
legal and financial systems. The fourth and fifth points 
concern the need for savings to fuel investment but 
with an important twist: countries that rely too heavily 
on international savings and investment are at a disad-
vantage—domestic savings play an important role in 
growth. 
Points six through 10 are about government or 
government policies. Point 6, on the need for public 
investment especially in infrastructure, underscores the 
importance of governments doing what only they can 
do. Points 7 and 8 deserve emphasis because they deal 
with the incentives government creates for investment, 
a topic the next section takes up. The last two, on the 
need for equality of opportunity and for “capably, cred-
ible and committed government” are the weakest and 
least useful based on the 13 countries in question. This 
is not because they are wrong, but rather because they 
don’t provide much guidance for governments or gov-
ernance. On equal opportunity, the Report does point 
out that this is not the same thing as equal outcomes, 
but that rather misses the point. Brazil, one of the 13 
success stories, has for years topped the list of the 
world’s most unequal income distributions, and is hardly 
a bastion of equal opportunity. 
As for governance, the range of governments and 
leadership among the 13 countries suggests a more 
complex and conditioned explanation for the role gov-
ernance play in producing good growth. The presence in 
the list of several large governance-challenged countries 
among the 13 suggests that size, potential returns 


















































































governance as investment decision determinants. 
Investment is the main driver of growth in most 
developing countries, and will likely be so in Central and 
Greater Central Asia. With this in mind, the following sec-
tion looks at the determinants of countries’ investment.
Understanding investment incentives
As the Growth Commission confirms, when labor is 
abundant, investment flows set the limits to growth 
which means that if we want to understand growth we 
need to understand what determines investment. Of all 
the inputs into growth, investment is the most mobile. 
This is nearly as true for domestic investment as it is 
for international investment. The high mobility of invest-
able funds means that investment flows are especially 
responsive to incentives. 
As we consider Central Asia’s private sector future, 
we need to think about two sources of investment 
incentives, how Central Asia’s business environment 
stacks up against other countries in the competition for 
investment, and what Central Asia’s neighborhood and 
other characteristics say about the types of investment 
companies will find attractive. 
In terms of competition for investment and business, 
the Growth Commission’s 13 stars show that countries 
with large domestic markets, abundant low-cost labor, 
and easy global access get by with considerably poorer 
business and governance environment rankings than 
do smaller, more isolated countries, natural resource 
rich countries excepted. Table 1 ranks the 13 Growth 
Commission countries plus countries that will soon 
make the cut (India and Vietnam) by their 2007 Doing 
Business scores. 
The table makes no attempt at analysis, but it is sug-
gestive of the notion that size and location matter a lot. If 
we drop Japan as not really relevant to this discussion, 
and Malta for lack of a ranking, the top five countries 







Average Net FDI 
2000-2007 (% of 
GDP)
Singapore 1 4.59 5.9 14.9
Hong Kong, China 3 6.93 5.3 19.3
Thailand 12 63.83 5.0 3.7
Japan 15 127.77 1.7 0.2
Korea, Republic 19 48.46 5.2 0.8
Malaysia 23 26.55 5.6 3.1
Botswana 45 1.88 5.6 3.0
Taiwan* 46 .. .. ..
Oman 65 2.60 4.5 1.4
China 89 1,318.31 10.1 3.3
Vietnam 93 85.15 7.6 4.6
Indonesia 122 225.63 5.0 0.2
Brazil 129 191.60 3.4 2.9
India 133 1,124.79 7.2 1.2
Malta .. 0.41 2.2 11.2
*World Bank WDI tables from which the economic data are drawn do not contain separate information for Taiwan.
Growth Commission Countries Plus Two



















































































average nearly 600 million. Even more striking, the top 
two countries average less than 6 million people, the 
bottom two, nearly 660 million. On location, as I noted 
earlier, only one country among the 13 is land locked. 
The messages are clear: if you are small and not oil or 
diamond rich, you had better have an outstanding busi-
ness environment. If you are small and land locked (and 
no diamonds), you are doubly damned.
In terms of the types of activities into which invest-
ment flows, if we want good growth, not just any 
investment will do. Developing countries in general, 
resource-rich countries in particular, often find foreign 
and domestic investment going into the “wrong” sectors. 
Funds flow into finance, quick return investments, real 
estate, service, when job-creating manufacturing and 
processing investments are what is needed, especially in 
agriculture-related industries.
Why is this so? The answer lies in part in the incen-
tives investors face generated by real and perceived 
risks found in many developing countries. Most devel-
oping countries are characterized by new institutions, 
short policy track records, and uncertain politics. Even 
in dictatorships, future policies and property rights can 
be hard to predict. In these environments two types 
of investments will appeal: those that pay off quickly; 
and those in sectors in which foreign know-how and 
assistance are essential to domestic revenues, extractive 
industries mainly. Neither of these investment types gen-
erates the broad-based, labor-using growth developing 
countries want and need.
Developing countries’ track records on policy 
consistency and respect of property rights lead inves-
tors to engage in the economic equivalent of profiling. 
They look at a country’s characteristics and history, and 
assume that what has happened in the past in that and 
other similar countries is a good predictor of the future. 
This means that a developing country government truly 
committed to the irreversibility of its reforms may still be 
viewed with distrust, leading good policies, at least in 
the short run, to produce “bad” growth, or at least not 
good growth as defined above. Countries with histories 
of policy reversals face an even steeper uphill battle to 
convince investors that they really have seen the light.
The risk of reputational stasis underscores the need 
to look beyond stated policies and procedures as we 
consider Central Asian business environments. If we are 
seeking investment that delivers good growth, we need 
to consider what countries can do and are doing to get 
ahead of the reputational curve. Several of the Growth 
Commission countries may offer lessons in this regard. 
Indonesia, for example, managed to convince investors 
that its policies were sufficiently predicable and stable 
to support longer payoff manufacturing investments, 
this in a less than ideal business environment. How it 
did so is a longer story than space permits for here, but 
Indonesia’s message is that there are ways to beat the 
reputation trap.
The Spence Growth Commission work carries 
important lessons for developing countries as they 
search for successful private sector development strate-
gies. In the next section, we look first at what we know 
about Central Asia’s business environments, and then 
consider what the region and each country needs to 
do to improve the prospects for future private sector 
growth.
III.  Central Asia Business Environments: 
what we know, what to do
The following discussion divides “Central Asia” into 
the five core republics (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, 
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan), and four countries 
that are a part of what might be called Greater Central 
Asia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Mongolia. As 
the main thrust of this review is on the five Central Asian 
republics, the main analysis is for these countries. 
The previous section makes clear that a review of 
Central Asia’s business environments and how to 
improve them must be embedded in the context in 
which the five republics find themselves. The compara-
tive data given in Tables A1 and A2 of the first Annex 


















































































Population among the five republics range by a factor 
of five, per capita income by a factor of six, savings 
rates by five, agriculture value added by six. The largest 
economy, Kazakhstan is nearly 25 times the size of the 
smallest economy, Tajikistan. And while the five do share 
a common history as past members of the former Soviet 
Union, they have chosen different development paths 
since independence, which puts them at very different 
points along the road to private sector development.
Central Asia’s diversity makes a discussion of “the” 
Central Asia business environment neither easy nor 
especially useful. However, before we turn to the dif-
ferences, let’s focus for a moment on some important 
common features. All five republics are, of course, a 
product of 70 years of Soviet oversight and influence. 
Although at the crossroad of Eurasia, they are isolated 
by distance, and, as we shall see, by infrastructure and 
technology, from the global economy7. They are not in 
the best of neighborhoods, although this ‘neighborhood 
effect” differs significantly among the five countries 
(Kazakhstan’s borders with Russia and China give it 
access to important markets for its energy resources; 
Tajikistan’s border with Afghanistan connects it with 
one of the world’s most unstable and volatile countries). 
These common factors influence each republic’s 
“business environment,” but country-specific effects 
dominate.
 The past decade has seen an explosion of competi-
tiveness and business environment surveys, including 
but not limited to the World Bank’s Doing Business 
and Enterprise surveys, the World Economic Forum’s 
Global Competitiveness Report, and Global Enabling 
Trade Report, Transparency International’s Corruption 
Perception Index, the Heritage Foundation’s Index of 
Economic Freedom, Foreign Policy’s Globalization Index 
and the EBRD’s Transition Report. Several of these 
various assessments are pulled together by Michigan 
State University’s globalEDGE program8. Annex 2 
7  Johannes Linn, “Kazakhstan’s Future at the Heart of Eurasian Integration,” 
Presentation at the Roundtable on The Future of Kazakhstan: Forming the National Policy 
Agenda, 8 November, 2005, Almaty, Kazakhstan
8  International Business Center, Michigan State University, globalEDGE (http://
globaledge.msu.edu/)
provides comparative tables from globalEDGE, updated 
where necessary by the most recent data. Annexes 3 
and 4 give, respectively, Enterprise Survey data and 
results from EBRD’s Transition Report. By way of sum-
mary, Table 1 presents three of the main indices for 
the Central Asian Republics and for four comparator 
countries, along with several key economic performance 
indicators (GDP growth, FDI flows and manufacturing 
value-added).
The numbers in Table 2 are not meant to suggest 
causality but they do illustrate the variety of relationships 
one sees in the data. The stories told by the three busi-
ness environment measures are not always consistent, 
especially evident for the Kyrgyz Republic. As the Box 
on p. 15 shows, the just-released 2010 Doing Business 
rankings identify the Kyrgyz Republic as one of the top 
10 reformers, a position the country also held in 2008. 
The Kyrgyz Republic’s reform prowess has moved it into 
the top quartile of all ranked Doing Business (DB) coun-
tries. In contrast, the Global Competitiveness Report 
(GCR) paints a quite different Kyrgyz story, putting the 
country in the bottom decile of the 134 ranked countries, 
one place lower than in the 2008/09 survey. On the 
corruption front, Transparency International’s Corruption 
Perceptions Index also has the Kyrgyz Republic in the 
bottom decile of the 180 ranked countries. So, who is 
right?
Doing Business, the Global Competitiveness Report 
and the Corruption Perceptions Index all have their sup-
porters and critics. DB is a compilation of laws, regula-
tions, and processes, the GCR a complex mix of factual 
data and opinion, CPI, as its name implies, a collection 
of perceptions. One interpretation of the Kyrgyz story is 
that it shows the difficulty countries face in closing the 
gap between creating laws, regulations and processes 
on paper, and building the institutions needed to imple-
ment these changes. If we add to this story the outcome 
variability among the 10 countries seen in Table 1, it 
seems clear that for small, geographically disadvantaged 
countries, the business environment as codified in a 


















































































sector development. As common sense would suggest, 
it’s what happens on the ground that counts.
A country’s business rules and regulations and their 
implementation are part of the equation that determines 
good growth, but, so, too, is the neighborhood in which 
it operates. When Central Asia was a unified entity under 
Soviet rule, regional issues among the five republics 
were managed in Moscow. Independence removed 
Moscow as a regional coordinator. Before we turn to 
the individual republics, the next section discusses the 
region’s lingering regional issues. 
The regional dimension
It is not entirely the case that “united they stand, divided 
they fall,” but it is hard to imagine a future in which the 
Central Asian republics’ economies are not intertwined. 
Especially for the smaller republics, being a part of a 
larger Central Asia economic region is almost a sine qua 
non for survival. Yet, current trade and transport policies 
are designed more to isolate than to integrate. There are 
at least five regional issues that bear on the business 
environments of individual republics.
Transport. Transport that connects the Central Asian 
states with each other and with the outside world is a 
fundamental element of Central Asia’s business environ-
ment. Central Asia’s position at the crossroads of greater 
Eurasia will be of little use if its transport facilities do not 
support transit traffic. Roads need to connect, railways 
to join seamlessly. Most importantly, borders need to 
be cross-able, which, according to Doing Business, 
they are not. Central Asia’s borders remain among the 
most costly in the world to cross. With cooperation, 
Central Asia can parley its centrality into effective links to 
outside markets. Land locked, isolated countries are at 
the mercy of their neighbors when they want to export 
anything but light manufacturing that can ship by air. A 
transit system that connects the great markets to Central 
Asia’s north, east and south will be a system that, as 
well, connects Central Asian producers to outside 
markets.
2009 2000-2007 Averages
DB GCR CPI GDP Growth 
Rate





Kazakhstan 63 67 145 10.2 8.5 14.7
Kyrgyz Republic 41 122 166 4.5 3.1 15.3
Tajikistan 152 122 151 8.7 5.7 27.6
Turkmenistan .. .. 166 5.4 10.1
Uzbekistan 150 .. 174 6.0 0.9 9.9
Comparators
Indonesia 122 54 111 5.0 0.2 28.4
Malaysia 23 24 56 5.6 3.1 29.6
Philippines 144 87 139 5.1 1.6 22.8
Vietnam 93 75 120 7.6 4.6 20.4
Notes:   DB - Doing Business (out of 183)
  GCR - Global Competitiveness Report (out of 134)
  CPI - Corruption Perception Index (out of 180)
Measures of the Business Environment



















































































Energy. As a recent study of Africa’s private sector 
growth demonstrates9, energy, or a lack thereof, can 
be one of the most critical bottlenecks to private sec-
tor development. Central Asia’s energy resources are 
potentially prodigious, but not evenly distributed and 
not well developed. Two countries, the Kyrgyz Republic 
and Tajikistan, are blessed with abundant hydro power 
potential, two others, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, 
with substantial hydrocarbon reserves. The intelligent 
development of regional energy markets could do much 
to improve energy access and reliability, and lower its 
cost.
Water. Much of Central Asia’s non-petroleum GDP 
is generated by agriculture, and much of that agricul-
ture is irrigated. But, as with energy, water distribution 
among the republics is highly skewed, with the Kyrgyz 
Republic and Tajikistan generating the lion’s share, 
and Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan consuming most 
of it. Historic water allocations from Central Asia’s two 
great rivers, the Amu Darya and Syr Darya, are under 
stress, as is much of the inherited Soviet era water 
infrastructure. If and when Northern Afghanistan’s agri-
culture develops, tensions around the allocation of the 
Amu Darya waters will be even greater. For nearly two 
decades the international community has worked with 
little success to improve water management and inter-
country water cooperation. Climate change is already 
affecting the winter run-off which feeds the system. 
Without an efficient, cost effective and reliable water 
system, much of Central Asia’s agriculture will not attract 
new investment. 
Market. Central Asia’s isolation is a constraint to glo-
bal connectivity, but could and should be a boon to local 
producers. Central Asia’s 60 million people represent 
a market almost as large as Thailand’s. If Central Asia 
were, if not one market, then five well integrated markets, 
the region’s attractiveness to entrepreneurs and inves-
tors would increase substantially. Yet, regional free trade 
agreements notwithstanding, the five countries now do 
9  Vijaya Ramachandran, Alan Gelb, and Manju Kedia Shah. Africa’s Private 
Sector: What’s Wrong with the Business Environment and What to Do About It, Center for 
Global Development, 2009
more to isolate and protect their domestic markets than 
to integrate them. This has to change if Central Asia’s 
non-extractive industries and non-energy investment is 
to take off.
Corruption. Business environments in Central Asia’s 
five republics differ in many respects, but there is one 
unfortunate feature in which they have much in com-
mon: corruption. Not one Central Asian country ranks 
above the bottom fifth of countries in Transparency 
International’s CPI. This is a problem each country must 
deal with, but it is also a regional problem. Reputation 
effects don’t stop at borders. Even were one republic to 
succeed in cleaning up its corruption act, it would face 
an uphill battle convincing investors that it had seen the 
light if corruption in its Central Asian neighbors were 
as bad as ever. Some of the Growth Commission suc-
cesses had high corrupt levels, but these were the big 
countries for which investors were willing to accept cor-
ruption to compete for high returns. None of the smaller 
countries succeeded until they dealt with corruption. 
While it is difficult to imagine a flourishing Central 
Asian private sector unless these regional issues are 
dealt with, regional integration will not by itself generate 
vibrant private sector growth. Central Asia’s republics 
must as well move aggressively to repair and improve 
their domestic business environments. The next part of 
this section summarizes what is good and what is not 
so good in each republic’s overall private sector environ-
ment, and then considers what can be done to make 
things better. 
The five republics
Kazakhstan – oil rich and struggling to diversify
Kazakhstan stands apart from the rest of Central Asia on 
a number of dimensions. Its economy is larger than the 
other four republics combined. It is significantly wealthier 
in terms of public savings and offshore assets. It has 
more sophisticated institutions, including  the region’s 
strongest financial system. It has legitimate, if not entirely 


















































































growth for the past decade, averaging a highly respect-
able 10% a year from 2000-2007. Yet, Kazakhstan’s 
senior decision makers are worried. To their credit, they 
recognize that too much of their good fortune rests on 
their hydrocarbon resources. They know they need to 
expand the country’s economic base beyond oil, gas 
and minerals.
Kazakhstan’s business environment ratings put it in 
the top one third of all DB countries and roughly in the 
middle of the GCR ranking. But there are some areas 
in which it fares much worse than this average. For its 
management of construction permits and border cross-
ing, DB finds Kazakhstan far down the list. On construc-
tion permits, only 4 countries in the world rank lower 
than Kazakhstan (the government says this has now 
been fixed). When it comes to trading across borders, 
Kazakhstan is at the bottom of all countries. Even after 
a meteoric rise between the 2009 and 2010 rankings, it 
still stands only at 143 out of 182 countries. 
The Enterprise survey data in Annex 3 raise as many 
questions as they answer. Tax rates are cited as the 
number one constraint in 2009, yet, according to the 
Forbes Tax Misery Index, Kazakhstan ranked 54th out 
of 65 countries in terms of the misery it imposes on its 
tax payers, meaning that only 11 of the Forbes-ranked 
65 countries have less onerous tax regimes. In fact, 
were the Forbes tables to reflect recent Kazakhstan 
tax reforms, which reduced corporate taxes to a flat 
20% from 30% with further reductions in the offing, the 
country would score even better.  More than anything, 
this story warns against drawing conclusions from busi-
ness climate surveys in a world of fast changing policies. 
With recent reforms, the tax system is not likely to be 
an issue in future surveys, leaving corruption as the top 
constraint.
What’s good
•	 No major “resource curse” mistakes so far
•	 Next to big markets– Russia and China
•	 The hub of Eurasia
•	 Better than average (for the region) financial 
institutions 
•	 Overall good macro management
•	 Strong and ambitious leadership
What’s bad
•	 Smallish domestic market
•	 Stiff regional market competition (Russia, China)
•	 Perception of risky property rights, unreliable 
adjudication processes
•	 Isolated by its border policies
•	 High cost, low quality infrastructure, especially 
transport, IT
•	 Skill shortage in areas of possible economic 
expansion
•	 Dutch Disease a challenge
What can be done?
Because it has the resources and a relatively sophis-
ticated public sector, Kazakhstan’s future lies much 
more in its own hands than some of the other Central 
Asian republics. But with a small domestic market, how 
Kazakhstan grows depends critically on how quickly 
the country can improve its business environment and 
its connection to the rest of the world. Improving its 
business environment involves institutional develop-
ment—simplified rules and regulations, better regulatory 
mechanisms, stronger financial and legal systems, 
better government—as well as infrastructure investment. 
Connecting to the rest of the world involves reducing the 
“economic” distance between Kazakhstan and the rest 
of the world. These are tough but doable challenges.
In the near term, Kazakhstan needs to push hard 
to signal that it is leveling the playing field for all inves-
tors, foreign and domestic, by simplifying regulations, 
strengthening adjudication procedures, clarifying prop-
erty rights. Borders must be better managed, and those 
aspects of the DB survey where it falls down should 
immediately be fixed. To signal a long-term commitment 
to these changes, the development and enforcement 
of the underlying policies need to be transparent and 


















































































Kazakhstan and the rest of the world, the country must 
put national interests before special interests and open 
both Kazakhstan’s skies and its telecommunications 
industry to all comers. No improvement in its business 
processes will offset the fact that, as of now, it is hard to 
get to Kazakhstan and costly to access the rest of the 
world from it.
In the medium term, Kazakhstan must work to pro-
fessionalize its legal and banking systems through a pro-
gram of transparency and training. It must also reduce 
the enormous cost of transport by completing its huge 
road building agenda and reforming its rail management 
system. And, to ensure long term success, it must do a 
much better job than it has done investing in its people. 
Kyrgyz Republic – after an apparent 
good start, an uncertain future
At least on paper the Kyrgyz Republic seemed to be 
doing many things right when it first became independ-
ent. Its politics appeared to be more democratic and 
open than other Central Asian republics, its economic 
policies more market oriented (it was the first, and, to 
date, only, Central Asian member of the WTO), its presi-
dent seemed committed to joining the world community 
as quickly as possible. Times have changed. With Mr. 
Akayev’s “color revolution” ouster in 2005, the country’s 
real and reputational risk has gone up. Since then, the 
country seems headed down a road paved with corrup-
tion, cronyism, and drug money. 
As the Box on p. 14 points out, the Kyrgyz Republic 
is a test case of just how important the factors covered 
by the World Bank’s Doing Business are in determining 
a country’s private sector growth. The Kyrgyz Republic 
is a star DB pupil, ranking among the top 10 reformers 
worldwide for the past two years. In only three areas is it 
lagging: paying taxes, trading across borders, and clos-
ing a business. One of these, closing businesses, is easy 
to fix, the other two need policy and institutional change 
that will take time. Unfortunately, trading across borders 
and paying taxes are likely to be far more powerful 
determinants of Kyrgyz’s private sector growth than how 
difficult it is to close a business.  
I have already pointed out the different pictures the 
DB survey and Global Competitiveness Report paint of 
the Kyrgyz Republic, which suggests that the country’s 
main problem is the country’s implementation of its rules 
and regulations. Reforms do no good unless they are 
visible to businesses in their day-to-day activities. The 
Enterprise Survey data in Annex 3 raises yet another 
set of business environment issues: power shortages, 
finance, political instability, among others. In yet another 
demonstration of “everything is relative,” while the repub-
lic scores near the bottom of the Corruption Perception 
Index, only 10% of respondents to the Enterprise survey 
identified corruption as one of their greatest constraints. 
This is consistent with a recent analysis of business 
environments in Sub-Saharan Africa10, where, despite 
widespread corruption, electricity shortages were identi-
fied as the single most serious constraint to business 
growth in a number of countries.
What’s good
•	 Active civil society
•	 Strong financial support from Russia
•	 Strategically important to the West (a part of the 
northern supply route to Afghanistan)
•	 Growing economic ties with its neighbors to the 
north and east.
•	 Hydropower potential, minerals. 
•	 Good Doing Business scores
What’s bad
•	 Weak and depreciating infrastructure, especially 
electricity
•	 Corruption 
•	 Highly concentrated economy
•	 Uncertain political situation
•	 Backsliding on openness, human rights, 
democracy
•	 Drug mafia a serious problem, especially in the 
south


















































































What can be done?
The Kyrgyz Republic is an enigma. It is an unlikely star 
performer in the Doing Business rankings, but, as one 
analyst put it, just how much the Doing Business scores 
are driving Kyrgyz FDI is the $100 million question to 
which no one has a clear answer. Much recent FDI 
has its origins in Russia and Kazakhstan, countries not 
known for their concern over the quality of business 
environments of the countries in which they invest. The 
Kyrgyz Republic’s future does depend on its ability to 
integrate with its larger neighbors, so Kazakhstan and 
Russian—and Chinese—investments are in principle 
a good thing.  But there are risks. Unless the Kyrgyz 
Republic wants to be owned by its neighbors, it will 
need to work quickly to reduce the country’s high politi-
cal risk so that it is able to attract a broader FDI base. 
The Belgium Export Credit Agency11 gives the Kyrgyz 
Republic a worse political risk score in the medium term 
than Turkmenistan, not a great signal to investors.
The Kyrgyz Republic’s main immediate challenge is 
reputational. The current government is not seen to have 
a clear vision for the future, and to be more interested 
in the short term gains to be had playing off US and 
Russian interests than in tackling the country’s pressing 
development problems. Given its small size, difficult 
location, and weak institutions and infrastructure, the 
country’s leadership must return to policy consistency, 
11  www.ondd.be
Doing Business 2010 is out and the Kyrgyz Republic is celebrating. It is among the world’s top 10 “reformers” as measured 
by the number of positions, especially impressive as it was a top 10 reformer in the 2009 version of the report as well. It now 
ranks 41st out of 183 countries, besting 7 of the Growth Commission successes + Vietnam and India (Table 1). According 
to Doing Business, the Kyrgyz Republic now has a better business environment than all but 16 mid-sized countries by 
population, beating out the likes of the Slovak Republic, Bulgaria, Hungary, Portugal, the Czech Republic, and Greece. Is all 
this hard work paying off where it matters, on the investment front? As the following table shows, based on  FDI and private 
equity investment in the Kyrgyz Republic from 1999-2007, the answer is, “maybe.” Work is under way to sort out what is 
driving Kyrgyz’s FDI,  much of which is of Russian or Kazakhstani origins.
Source: World Development Indicators





















































































clean up its governance act and seek international 
assistance in stemming the flow of drugs and drug 
money into and through the country.
Tajikistan – one too many constraints?
One of the world’s most geographically isolated coun-
tries, Tajikistan is 2,000 kilometers from the nearest 
port, 93% mountainous, and in a tough neighborhood. 
High mountains separate it from the Kyrgyz Republic 
and China to the north and east. To the south, at least 
for now, its long border with Afghanistan creates more 
security and drug trafficking problems than it does 
trade opportunities. Its fourth neighbor, Uzbekistan, 
considers it a security risk and maintains tight controls 
over their shared border. While transit to and trade 
with Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran may someday be 
important in Tajikistan’s economy, the country’s access 
to export markets is likely to remain constrained for the 
foreseeable future. 
In contrast to the Kyrgyz Republic, all business 
climate assessments agree that Tajikistan is not an 
attractive place to do business. Having said this, surpris-
ingly, and somewhat ironically, Tajikistan ranks ahead 
of the Kyrgyz Republic (by one position) in the Global 
Competitiveness ranking. The bad news is that many 
elements of Tajikistan’s business environment need 
fixing. The good news is, there is plenty of room for 
improvement.
What’s good
•	 Abundant hydropower potential
•	 Potential transit country linking Afghanistan, 
Pakistan and India to the north
What’s bad
•	 Geography (93% mountainous)
•	 Risks becoming a narco state
•	 Weak institutions
•	 Bad competitiveness rankings
•	 Weak government capacity, inconsistent 
leadership
What can be done?
Tajikistan’s geography has an important implication 
for its private sector growth strategy: in contrast to 
the export-led successes of East Asia, in the near and 
medium term it will have to rely on natural endowments 
and its domestic economy for growth. Electricity exports 
to the south offer great potential, but not until the 
security situations in Afghanistan and Pakistan improve. 
Small and medium scale enterprises will be the primary 
engine of growth in both rural and urban areas, putting 
special emphasis on the need to improve the business 
climate that affects local businesses. The international 
community can help but only if the country’s leadership 
shows that it is serious about modernizing its institutions 
and improving its infrastructure. Russia and China, as 
key partners on commercial, development and security 
fronts, could play central roles but need to take a longer 
term development perspective in their dealings with the 
country.
Turkmenistan – where to start?
In 2004, during the waning reign of President-for-life 
Niyazov, I traveled to the port of Turkmanbashi on the 
Caspian Sea with the deputy governor of the country’s 
central bank. In Turkmanbashi, we visited Turkmenistan’s 
one and only oil refinery. I asked my host how much 
money the refinery lost every year, given that petrol sold 
for something like 10 US cents a gallon. He told me, no, 
on the contrary, the refinery made money. I asked him 
how that was possible given the incredibly low con-
sumer prices for petroleum products in Turkmenistan. 
He replied that the refinery “purchased” petroleum 
feedstock at about USD10 per ton. When I asked why 
the government sold oil that was bringing in excess 
of USD350 per ton on the open market for USD10, he 
looked puzzled. 
Later, as we were walking back to the airplane that 
would take us on the hour flight back to Ashgabad, I 
asked how much a ticket for this flight cost. He said 
the local equivalent of about USD1.50 (admittedly at 

















































































? government could afford to run an airline that charged 
such low fares. “Now you understand why we have to 
buy oil at USD10.00 a ton,” was his reply. More than any 
other Central Asian republic, Turkmenistan continued 
the prices-be-damned, command-and-control economy 
inherited from the Soviet system when it became an 
independent state.
Turkmenistan has never had anything resembling 
a market economy, so, even asking about its business 
environment seems a bit pointless, which may explain 
why it has no Doing Business ranking and most of the 
Turkmen entries in Annex 2 are blank. Many important 
prices in the economy were controlled in Niyazov’s time, 
and remain so today. There are isolated islands of eco-
nomic sanity, but these are mainly ring-fenced export-
oriented manufacturers with close ties to the power 
structure (and often fed by subsidized inputs). EBRD’s 
Transition Report (Annex 4) designates Turkmenistan its 
“minimum transition country”, giving it the lowest pos-
sible rating for 6 of the 9 areas assessed. 
While there is much we do not know about 
Turkmenistan, those in the business of assessing risk, 
for example, the Belgium Export Credit Agency, ONDD, 
consider it a high risk place to do business, as the 
following ONDD assessment shows. High political risk 
coupled with high expropriation transfer risk mean that 
outside investors will seek exceptional returns before 
they will come to Turkmenistan.
What’s good
•	 Abundant natural resources, especially gas 
•	 A new political regime that has shown tentative 
signs of opening up
•	 A reasonably well educated population 
•	 A spectacular, if surreal, capital city
What’s bad
•	 Enough natural resource wealth and income to 
avoid economic reform for some time
•	 A highly concentrated economy (hydrocarbons 
Source: Belgium Export Credit Agency. Columns are self explanatory with the exception of Commercial risk, where “C” represents “high risk. For a full explanation, see www.ondd.be 






















































































•	 A government with little capacity to understand 
and institute needed reforms
•	 No formal private sector to speak of
•	 Crumbling infrastructure outside of Ashgabad
What can be done?
Where does one start in improving Turkmenistan’s busi-
ness environment? One starts with the recognition that it 
will take many years to create the institutions needed to 
support a market economy, and for the Turkmen people 
to adapt to the new system. Shock therapy of the post-
Soviet Russian type will not work.
Turkmenistan’s near-term future is not about getting 
its business environment right, or, at least not in the nar-
row, Doing Business or Global Competitiveness sense. 
It is about a slow, steady cultural change. Oil and gas 
are natural starting points, but these investments need 
to be joined with firm but realistic efforts to influence the 
broader business environment. Here, the multinational 
petroleum companies that will help Turkmenistan exploit 
its petroleum wealth will play a key role, possibly more 
important than multilateral development institutions. The 
multinationals will have to walk a difficult line that gives 
them access to Turkmenistan’s lucrative gas reserves 
but does so in a way that contributes to Turkmenistan’s 
longer term economic growth and stability. 
Uzbekistan – much going for it…
except the policy reform it needs
When I arrived in Central Asia for the World Bank in 
2001, I came straight from Vietnam, one of the two “also 
rans” among the Growth Commission report successes. 
As I took my first tour of the region, I was stunned at the 
development challenges, especially the apparent lack 
of entrepreneurial activity, which had been so prevalent 
in Vietnam. The one exception was Uzbekistan. The 
hustle and bustle of the Ferghana Valley reminded me 
of Vietnam. With a population of close to 27 million, 
Uzbekistan seemed ripe for development beyond its 
Soviet legacy of cotton.
What happened over the next seven years has 
been a mix of good news and bad news. After avoid-
ing the major economic downturn other Central Asian 
economies suffered after independence, Uzbekistan has 
done well growth-wise, especially in the last few years, 
but the economy remains too dependent on cotton and 
natural resources, and too controlled. Gold, cotton and 
energy (gas) accounted for nearly 60% of Uzbekistan’s 
2007 exports. The government’s efforts to industrialize 
and diversify are not based on comparative advantage 
analysis. As an example of this, its fledgling automotive 
industry is heavily subsidized, sells mainly to Russia, 
and has been hard hit by the global economic downturn 
(early 2009 saw an 85% drop in Uzbek automotive 
exports to Russia).
What’s good
•	 Relatively large internal market
•	 Strong fiscal position, good macroeconomic 
discipline
•	 Significant reserves to support reforms and 
infrastructure investment
•	 Historically entrepreneurial population
What’s bad
•	 Remains a closed, opaque economic system
•	 Market institutions still in their infancy
•	 Current growth driven by high commodity 
prices, subsidies and special deals. 
What can be done?
As with Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan’s private sector future is 
much more in its hands than is the case for the smaller 
Central Asian countries. For Uzbekistan, an improved 
“business environment” in the wider sense of poli-
cies aimed at promoting sustainability, diversification, 
improved legal and banking systems, clearer property 
rights, less government interference, would make a 
major difference to investment and growth. The chal-
lenge will be credibility. The Karimov government has 


















































































preferring old Soviet-style control. Yet, the gains from a 
move toward freer markets could be, and likely would 
be, substantial. Were the government to decide to open 
up the economy, the international community would 
have a significant role to play. Uzbekistan has a com-
petent government, but not one that fully understands 
private sector policies. Knowledge transfer from other 
CIS members further along in the reform process would 
be essential. If Uzbekistan’s leadership began opening 
up the country’s economy, Central Asia would have a 
second growth pole after Kazakhstan with significant 
benefits to the rest of the region.
The Greater Central Asia countries12 
The core Central Asian republics have historically been 
linked to neighboring countries by trade, transport, 
conflict and conquest. This larger region is part of what 
has come to be known as “Greater Central Asia13,” 
which, in turn, is seen as the hub of the Eurasian “super 
continent14” that stretches from Europe to the Pacific, 
from the Arctic Circle to the Indian Ocean. This section 
looks briefly at four countries that are to varying degrees 
a part of this Greater Central Asia: Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
12  In discussing consequences of the global recession, this section draws on 
the Asian Development Report’s Outlook 2009 Update, September, 2009.
13  S. Frederic Starr, “In defense of Greater Central Asia,” Policy Paper, Central 
Asia-Caucasus Institute, Silk Road Studies Program, September, 2008.
14  Johannes Linn and David Toimkin, “The New Impetus towards Economic 
Integration between Europe and Asia,” Asia Europe Journal, Apr 2006.
Georgia and Mongolia. Two important members of 
the Greater Central Asia grouping, Afghanistan and 
Pakistan, are not covered as their current circumstances 
make analysis of longer term development issues espe-
cially problematic. Nor does the section deal with the 
larger neighbors, China, Iran, Russia, Turkey, although 
each will most certainly play a role in the economic 
development of the countries covered here.
Armenia – a need to expand economic horizons
Armenia has been hard hit by the global recession. 
According to the Asian Development Bank’s Outlook 
2009 Update, GDP declined by over 16% in the first 
half of 2009, the construction industry collapsed, and 
exports fell by nearly half in the first quarter of 2009. 
The punishment Armenia took and is taking from the 
recession provides a window to the challenges it faces 
as it seeks to develop its private economy. The global 
crisis hit Armenia through a combination of dramatically 
reduced exports, declining remittances and consequent 
declines in domestic demand. There is no single answer 
to these challenges, but diversification of exports and 
sources of remittances will surely help.
Looking across the various measures of Armenia’s 
competitiveness and attractiveness to investment, the 
pictures that emerges is one of a country that has made 
progress is some areas, for example easy of doing 
2009 2000-2007 Averages
DB GCR CPI GDP Growth 
Rate




Armenia 43 97 120 11.75 5.53 39.25
Azerbaijan 38 51 143 17.37 13.80 56.35
Georgia 11 90 66 7.56 8.52 24.57
Mongolia 60 117 120 6.48 7.03 29.51
Notes:   DB - Doing Business (out of 183)
  GCR - Global Competitiveness Report (out of 134)
  CPI - Corruption Perception Index (out of 180)
Greater Central Asia Countries



















































































? business, but continues to struggle with endemic cor-
ruption, political stability and a weak market structure. 
The four top ranked constraints firms face in Armenia 
identified in Enterprise Survey data15 (Annex 3) are the 
competition from the informal sector, tax rates, political 
instability, and access to financing. These are symptoms 
of the same overall malady, an unstable political environ-
ment that promotes informality, undermines the tax base 
pushing rates up, and creates a risk profile that is unat-
tractive to investors and financiers. 
One message for Armenia from these surveys is 
that business climate reforms need to be accelerated to 
attract international investment. With a population of just 
3 million people, Armenia must integrate with the rest of 
Eurasia and the world if it is to continue to grow. To do 
this will require a world-class business environment. But 
non-business climate factors may well ultimately deter-
mine Armenia’s economic future. Continuing to develop 
15  World Bank/IFC 2009 Enterprise Survey data can be found at www.
enterprisesurveys.org.
its relations with Turkey will be key to diversifying its 
export market, and reducing dependence on Russia and 
the north.
Azerbaijan
Azerbaijan is a study in “everything is relative.” Its 
economy has been hit by the global recession, but most 
countries around the world would be delighted to have 
Azerbaijan’s 2009 growth (a positive 3.6% for the first 
half year) and current account (projected at a 15% sur-
plus) numbers. Like Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan has done a 
lot of things right, but faces enormous challenges wean-
ing itself off of its hydrocarbon dependency.
Azerbaijan’s economic and policy performance since 
2000 is impressive. In the first few years following the 
break-up of the Soviet Union, its economy shrank by 
50% with growth recovered to just over 5% per year in 
the last half of the 1990s. In the first eight years of this 
decade (2000-2007) it has averaged annual growth of 
more than 17%. Its business climate measures are better 





















































































on than Kazakhstan’s. It even bests the Kyrgyz Republic 
in the 2009 Doing Business ratings. It has the top Global 
Competitiveness ranking among the nine Greater Central 
Asian countries, better than all but Malaysia among the 
four comparator countries.  So, why isn’t its economy 
diversifying?
The four top constraints to businesses from the 
Enterprise surveys provide a hint at the remaining 
challenges. These are: access to finance, tax rates, 
corruption, and the informal sector. It is surprising and 
puzzling that tax rates rank at or near the top of the list 
of constraints to firm growth in Azerbaijan. Surprising 
because oil revenues provide the wherewithal for a low 
domestic tax regime; puzzling because, like Kazakhstan, 
the country does not score that badly on the Forbes 
“Tax Misery” index. All four Enterprise constraints point 
to an economy in which institutions are still work in 
progress. Lack of finance, corruption, tax problems, a 
too-large informal sector are symptoms of weak public 
and private institutions.
Georgia
Georgia ranks 11th out of 183 countries in the 2009 
Doing Business survey, 62nd on the Tax Misery scale, 
suggesting it has done about all that it can on the 
deregulation front to improve its business climate. Yet, 
the Global Business report puts it in the bottom half of 
the 134 ranked countries. Three factors stand out as 
barriers to business development from the Enterprise 
survey (Annex 3): access to financing, political instabil-
ity, and electricity. The first two are likely closely linked: 
Georgia’s recent problems with Russia and its internal 
political struggles exacerbated the effects of the global 
economic crisis, and raised its country risk profile in 
international markets. It is noteworthy that the Belgium 
Export Credit Agency finds some aspects of Georgia’s 
political risk profile more alarming that Turkmenistan, not 
a good sign to investors. 
The contrast between Georgia’s high business 
environment score, on the one hand, and its more 
cautionary Global Competitiveness ranking coupled with 
serious concerns about political risk on the other sug-
gest that its path to economic stability and growth will 
be dominated by more by geopolitics than by economic 
policy. 
Mongolia
Mongolia is a country of extremes. It is a sparsely 
populated (2.6 million people), large land-locked country 
(second in area after Kazakhstan) with fewer people per 
hectare than any other sovereign nation. Its harsh cli-
mate, fragile soils and uneven development have drawn 
40% of its population to Ulaanbaatar, the world’s coldest 
capital city. Its economy is highly concentrated and 
natural resource dependent, as evidenced from the hit 
it has taken from the global recession when the price of 
copper, its primary export and budget provider, dropped 
by nearly 70%. 
Copper prices have since recovered much of 
their loss (up nearly 140% from their low at the end of 
2008), but Mongolia’s basic challenge remains: to use 
its considerable natural resource wealth to underpin 
economic diversification through non-extractive-industry 
private sector growth. As with Turkmenistan, Mongolia’s 
private sector future depends in important ways on 
the companies that exploit its natural wealth. The 
recently-signed agreement with Ivanhoe Mines and Rio 
Tinto covering the Oye Tolgoi copper and gold mining 
complex is seen as a breakthrough agreement that will 
provide a framework for a host of other strategic mining 
agreements throughout Mongolia16. These agreements 
are a start, but only a start. The breadth and depth of 
the recession’s impact underscores Mongolia’s need 
to diversify its economic base. Over the medium term, 
human resource development and Ulaanbaatar’s 
infrastructure will play pivotal roles. In the near term, 
how Ivanhoe, Rio Tinto and other international extractive 
industry companies seek to integrate into and support 
Mongolia’s economy will be the dominant force shaping 
private sector development.




















































































IV.  Summing up
In commissioning this paper, the Emerging Market 
Forum asked five questions about Central Asia’s busi-
ness environments. Below my answers based on the 
preceding analysis:
•	 What is the reality of the business environment 
in Central Asia? Is it as bad as its reputation?
Because of their starting conditions, yes. 
The Central Asian republics are not blessed 
with either large domestic markets or easy 
access to trading partners, which means their 
business environments, must be near the top 
of the list to attract international capital and 
move local capital into job creating new busi-
nesses. Right now, these countries rank way 
below where they need to be. 
•	 What are the best ways to improve Central 
Asia’s business climate country-by-country and 
region-wide?
Recommendations for individual countries 
differ, but all depend on convincing investors 
that Central Asia’s governments understand 
the need for an arms-length, neutral relation-
ship with the private sector. Current practice 
has created a “credibility deficit” that will take 
considerable effort to close.
•	 How can private business and civil society best 
exert their influence to improve the business 
climate, public administration and governance in 
Central Asia?
The potential role of domestic private busi-
ness and civil society as agents of change 
varies among the five republics, from modest 
to very little. This will change over time, but in 
the meantime Central Asia’s abundant natural 
resources may offer a gateway to improved 
private sector environments. Multinational 
companies can play a key role in nudging 
Central Asian states toward better business 
environments beyond their own market niches 
if these companies avoid the temptation to 
accept bad policy regimes in the name of 
short-term profits. In the near term, Eurasia 
region’s powerhouses, Russia, China, Turkey, 
even Kazakhstan, are likely to continue to 
dominate FDI inflows. These countries and 
their main private investors need to come to 
the table when the future of Central Asia’s 
private sector is discussed.
•	 Is the link between political system and public 
sector governance a strong one? I.e., can 
authoritarian regimes as they are prevalent in 
Central Asia, provide credible assurances that 
they will improve economic governance and the 
investment climate?
As the Growth Commission work shows, 
the link between political systems and good 
governance is not strong. This holds for 
Central Asia as well. Accountability through 
democratic institutions is a long-term goal, 
and will be a long time in the making in Central 
Asia. Poor governance will continue to feed 
the credibility deficit. As with other aspects 
of these five countries, the ability of leaders 
to provide credible assurances varies. Some 
of Central Asia’s leadership has the stature to 
provide credible assurances. But others will 
need help, which is where the international 
community comes in (see the next point).
•	 Is there much that outsiders can do to help 
improve a country’s governance and investment 
climate?
Better governance, better business environ-
ments, policy credibility and coherence are 
inherently internal matters. But outsiders 


















































































commitment to improving their business envi-
ronments, outsiders can provided advice and 
experience, helping countries triage the many 
demanding policy challenges they face. It is, 
however, critical that this assistance be driven 
by the demands of the recipient country, and 
be tailored to local realities. When govern-
ments have made the move to better business 
environments, the international community 
can contribute to reducing the “credibility 
deficit” by underwriting policy changes 
though guarantees that make it costly for gov-
ernments to reverse course in the future and 
signal government commitment to reform con-
tinuity. Of course, the international community 
has a reputation to keep as well, and needs to 
be quite sure that countries are serious about 
reforming their business environments.
•	 What specific actions could be recommended 
by the Eurasia Emerging Markets Forum for the 
various relevant actors in Central Asia (including, 
private entrepreneurs, national and sub-national 
governments, international partners, etc.) or 
what follow-up might be initiated by the Eurasia 
Emerging Markets Forum to help promote a bet-
ter investment climate in the region?
The country-by-country assessments given 
above provide guidance to the Forum on ways 
in which it can help improve Central Asia’s 
business environments, as do answers to 
the questions above. Specifically, the Forum 
could serve as the catalyst to push regional 
gatherings, especially CAREC, the Central 
Asia Regional Economic Cooperation organi-
zation, to intensify efforts to reduce regional 
constraints. Although already on CAREC’s 
agenda, the most pressing regional issue 
from a business perspective is the need to 
encourage trade among the five republics by 
lowering the cost of crossing borders. This 
is a quintessential regional issue. Getting 
things right on one side of a border is of little 
use if the other side remains problematic.  
Transport, critical for regional cooperation for 
obvious reasons, is a second CAREC focus 
area. 
The Forum is also well situated to push for a 
coordinated improvement in countries’ busi-
ness environments, and especially on reduc-
ing corruption, to offset the guilt-by-associa-
tion problem of having neighbors who are far 
behind on the reform front.  The Forum could 
also use its convening power to bring together 
communities of interest among the key play-
ers, entrepreneurs and civil society, national 
and sub-national governments, international 
partners, or to encourage others to do so. Two 
caveats: first, unless these partnerships find a 
way to go beyond talk, the business environ-
ment will not change and private sector devel-
opment will continue to languish. Second, the 
Forum must proceed under full knowledge of 
the regional institutions already in place. The 
problem is not a lack of regional institutions, 
but the effectiveness of existing institutions. 
If there is one message from this overview, it is that 
the “attractiveness” of a country’s business environment 
is situation dependent. When potential rewards are high, 
a less than ideal business environment may be just fine, 
but for smallish economies in geographically challenged 
locations even “above average” business environments 
may not be enough to induce good growth. If the Central 
Asian economies recognize this reality as they set out 
to improve their business and policy environments, their 
private sectors will become the foundation not only for 
stable and equitable growth, but for a prosperous and 
secure region that rediscovers to its historic roots as a 















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Population, total Rural population 
(% of total)
Life expectancy at 
birth, male (years) 
- 2007
Population ages 
0-14 (% of total)
Armenia 3077087 36.1 70.2 20.5
Azerbaijan 8678851 48.1 63.8 24.6
Georgia 4364461 47.3 67.1 17.1
Kazakhstan 15674833 42.1 60.9 23.7
Kyrgyz Republic 5277900 63.7 63.5 29.7
Mongolia 2632387 42.8 63.9 26.5
Tajikistan 6836083 73.5 64.1 37.5
Turkmenistan 5028041 51.4 59.0 30.1
Uzbekistan 27313700 63.2 64.0 30.1
Source: World Bank Group: World Development Indicators






















































































Corruption Perceptions Index 120 out of 180
Ease of Doing Business Rankings 63 out of 183
E-readiness Rankings 66 out of 70
Freedom of the Press 170 out of 194
Global Competitiveness Report 67 out of 134
Global Enabling Trade Report 72 out of 118
Global Services Location Index -
Index of Economic Freedom 76 out of 155
Inward FDI Potential Index 46 out of 140
Tax Misery & Reform Index 54 out of 65
The Globalization Index  -
Kyrgyz Republic
Corruption Perceptions Index 162 out of 180
Ease of Doing Business Rankings 41 out of 183
E-readiness Rankings -
Freedom of the Press 156 out of 194
Global Competitiveness Report 122 out of 134
Global Enabling Trade Report 109 out of 118
Global Services Location Index -
Index of Economic Freedom 70 out of 155
Inward FDI Potential Index 110 out of 140
Tax Misery & Reform Index -
The Globalization Index -
Tajikistan
Corruption Perceptions Index 158 out of 180
Ease of Doing Business Rankings 152 out of 183
E-readiness Rankings -
Freedom of the Press 168 out of 194
Global Competitiveness Report 122 out of 134
Global Enabling Trade Report 104 out of 118
Global Services Location Index -
Index of Economic Freedom 114 out of 155
Inward FDI Potential Index 93 out of 140
Tax Misery & Reform Index -























































































Corruption Perceptions Index 168 out of 180
Ease of Doing Business Rankings -
E-readiness Rankings -
Freedom of the Press 193 out of 194
Global Competitiveness Report -
Global Services Location Index -
Index of Economic Freedom 152 out of 155
Tax Misery & Reform Index -
The Globalization Index  -
Uzbekistan
Corruption Perceptions Index 174 out of 180
Ease of Doing Business Rankings 150 out of 183
E-readiness Rankings -
Freedom of the Press 189 out of 194
Global Competitiveness Report -
Global Enabling Trade Report 105 out of 118
Global Services Location Index -
Index of Economic Freedom 130 out of 155
Inward FDI Potential Index 98 out of 140
Tax Misery & Reform Index 43 out of 65
The Globalization Index -
GREATER CENTRAL ASIA COUNTRIES
Armenia
Corruption Perceptions Index 120 out of 180
Ease of Doing Business Rankings 43 out of 183
E-readiness Rankings -
Freedom of the Press 64 out of 191
Global Competitiveness Report 97 out of 134
Global Enabling Trade Report 61 out of 118
Global Services Location Index -
Index of Economic Freedom 28 out of 155
Inward FDI Potential Index 73 out of 140
Tax Misery & Reform Index -






















































































Corruption Perceptions Index 143 out of 180
Ease of Doing Business Rankings 38 out of 183
E-readiness Rankings 69 out of 70
Freedom of the Press 73 out of 191
Global Competitiveness Report 51 out of 134
Global Enabling Trade Report 76 out of 118
Global Services Location Index -
Index of Economic Freedom 107 out of 155
Inward FDI Potential Index 64 out of 140
Tax Misery & Reform Index 36 out of 65
The Globalization Index  -
Georgia
Corruption Perceptions Index 66 out of 180
Ease of Doing Business Rankings 11 out of 183
E-readiness Rankings -
Freedom of the Press 57 out of 191
Global Competitiveness Report 90 out of 134
Global Enabling Trade Report -
Global Services Location Index -
Index of Economic Freedom 32 out of 155
Inward FDI Potential Index 102 out of 140
Tax Misery & Reform Index 62 out of 65
The Globalization Index -
Mongolia
Corruption Perceptions Index 120 out of 180
Ease of Doing Business Rankings 60 out of 183
E-readiness Rankings -
Freedom of the Press 34 out of 191
Global Competitiveness Report 117 out of 134
Global Enabling Trade Report 93 out of 118
Global Services Location Index -
Index of Economic Freedom 78 out of 198
Inward FDI Potential Index 71 out of 140
Tax Misery & Reform Index -
























































































Corruption Perceptions Index 111 out of 180
Ease of Doing Business Rankings 122 out of 183
E-readiness Rankings 68 out of 70
Freedom of the Press 114 out of 194
Global Competitiveness Report 54 out of 134
Global Enabling Trade Report 47 out of 118
Global Services Location Index 6 out of 198
Index of Economic Freedom 119 out of 155
Inward FDI Potential Index 100 out of 140
Tax Misery & Reform Index 47 out of 65
The Globalization Index  69 out of 198
Malaysia
Corruption Perceptions Index 56 out of 180
Ease of Doing Business Rankings 23 out of 183
E-readiness Rankings 34 out of 70
Freedom of the Press 141 out of 194
Global Competitiveness Report 24 out of 134
Global Enabling Trade Report 29 out of 118
Global Services Location Index 3 out of 198
Index of Economic Freedom 51 out of 155
Inward FDI Potential Index 40 out of 140
Tax Misery & Reform Index 49 out of 65
The Globalization Index 23 out of 198
Philippines
Corruption Perceptions Index 139 out of 180
Ease of Doing Business Rankings 144 out of 183
E-readiness Rankings 55 out of 70
Freedom of the Press 97 out of 194
Global Competitiveness Report 87 out of 134
Global Enabling Trade Report 82 out of 118
Global Services Location Index 8 out of 198
Index of Economic Freedom 92 out of 155
Inward FDI Potential Index 77 out of 140
Tax Misery & Reform Index 49 out of 65






















































































Corruption Perceptions Index 120 out of 180
Ease of Doing Business Rankings 93 out of 183
E-readiness Rankings 65 out of 70
Freedom of the Press 178 out of 194
Global Competitiveness Report 75 out of 134
Global Enabling Trade Report 91 out of 118
Global Services Location Index 19 out of 198
Index of Economic Freedom 135 out of 155
Inward FDI Potential Index 80 out of 140
Tax Misery & Reform Index 41 out of 65
The Globalization Index  48 out of 198
Source: International Business Center, Michigan State University, globalEDGE (http://globaledge.msu.edu/), updated where necessary to most recent surveys. For all but the Tax Misery series, low 





Corruption Perception Index – Transparency International
Ease of Doing Business – World Bank
E-readiness – Economist Intelligence Unit
Freedom of the Press – Freedom House
Global Competitiveness Report – World Economic Forum
Global Enabling Trade Report – World Economic Forum
Global Services Location Index – A.T. Kearney
Index of Economic Freedom – Heritage Foundation
Inward FDI Potential Index – UNCTAD 
Tax Misery & Reform Index – Forbes
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































EBRD Transition Indicators, 2009




















































































EBRD Transition Indicators, 2009
Central Asia
Annex 
3The Emerging Markets Forum was created by the Centennial Group as a not-for-pro￿t 
initiative to bring together high-level government and corporate leaders from around the 
world to engage in dialogue on the key economic, ￿nancial and social issues facing 
emerging market countries.
 
The Forum is focused on some 70 emerging market economies in East and South Asia, 
Eurasia, Latin America and Africa that share prospects of superior economic performance, 
already have or seek to create a conducive business environment and are of near-term 
interest to private investors, both domestic and international. Our current list of EMCs is 
shown on the back cover. We expect this list to eveolve over time, as countries’ policies and 
prospects change.      
Further details on the Forum and its meetings may be seen on our website at http://www.emergingmarketsforum.org
The Watergate O￿ce Building, 2600 Virginia Avenue, NW, Suite 201
Washington, DC 20037, USA.  Tel:(1) 202 393 6663  Fax: (1) 202 393 6556
Email: info@emergingmarketsforum.org 
















































Bringing people together to 
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